February 09, 2008

DESTINATION: **08SEOUL129|08SEOUL2305**

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UNCLAS SEOUL 000179 


SENSITIVE
SIPDIS

C O R R E C T E D COPY CAPTION
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PHUM, SREF, PGOV, PROP, PREL, KS, KN
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR’S TRIP TO HANAWON AND HANGYERAE
RESETTLEMENT SUPPORT INSTITUTIONS — EFFECTIVE FIRST STEPS
FOR NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS

REF: A. 2008 SEOUL 02305 
B. 2008 SEOUL 00129 

1. (SBU) Summary: The Ambassador’s January 29 visit to
Hanawon Resettlement Center and Hangyerae Middle and High
School revealed clean and modern facilities that show
effective ROKG support for North Korean defectors on arrival
in the ROK. During 2008, Hanawon’s main campus for female
defectors doubled its maximum capacity from 300 to 600 
(partly by shortening training time), preparing to
accommodate 3,600 women trainees per year; men are trained at
another center. Meanwhile, the Hangyerae School, an
interagency effort to bridge defectors’ educational gap, is
overcrowded with 280 students and is seeking additional
funding. Recently arrived North Korean defectors told the
Ambassador that they were in touch with family in North Korea
and planned to bring children and other family members to the
ROK, though they lamented that life in the ROK was more alien
and required a bigger adjustment than living in China. End
Summary.

——————————————————————- ————
Hanawon Expansion: Well-funded; Ready To Receive More
——————————————————————- ————

2. (SBU) To accommodate the increasing number of North Korean
defectors each year (2,018 in 2006; 2,544 in 2007; and 2,809 
in 2008), the Ministry of Unification continues to spend
close to one-half of the ministry’s entire budget on Hanawon
(USD 67 million in 2009). During 2008, Hanawon’s main campus
for female defectors doubled its maximum capacity from 300 to
600, preparing to accommodate 3,600 women trainees per year.
The recent expansion and added employment training at Hanawon
and the existence of Hangyerae School, targeted to assist
North Korean defector teenagers, affirm a renewed ROKG
commitment to provide a strong resettlement program. Hanawon
and Hangyerae are located in isolated rural surroundings near
Ansung City, about an hour away from Seoul, but facilities
are clean and modern.

3. (SBU) Of the 2,809 North Korean defectors who arrived in
the ROK in 2008, 2,197 (78 percent) were women in their
twenties to forties. About 17 percent were teenagers in need
of middle or high school education. The overall number of
North Korean defectors in South Korea crossed the 15,000 
threshold in 2008. The number is expected to continue to
rise in the coming year.

4. (SBU) Hanawon is the first stop for virtually all North
Korean defectors after initial screening by the ROKG
intelligence services upon arrival. The main campus in
Ansung City opened in July 1999, two years after the
Settlement Support for Dislocated North Korea Act passed.
The center at first trained about 900 defectors per year, but
the need for an expansion came only a few years later. The
first expansion of the main campus in 2003 doubled its
maximum capacity from 150 to 300 and allowed for 1,800 
trainees per year. In 2006, a separate, smaller facility for
adult males opened in Si-heung City, where 93 male defectors
currently receive training. To accommodate an influx of
female defectors, who have outnumbered male defectors more
than three to one since 2006, Hanawon’s main campus took on a
second expansion, completed in December 2008. The center now
stands ready to receive up to 600 students at a time for
two-month orientation sessions; 3,600 per year. Currently,
Hanawon’s main complex is half full, occupied by 304 female
defectors, but Hanawon Director Ko Gyoung-bin seemed
confident that the new dorms would not remain empty for long.
Hanawon begins a new training class every three weeks and
three classes overlap during the 8-week period.

5. (SBU) Similar to previous years, about 44 percent of
MOU’s entire budget, or USD 67 million, is earmarked for
Hanawon in 2009. Hanawon’s facility was modern and
impressive, fully equipped with a dental clinic, internal
medicine and traditional Eastern medicine unit, nursery (as a
baby is born to a mother in training every twenty days),
cafeteria, computer labs, dormitories, library and an indoor
gym as well as a new outdoor soccer field. According to Ko,
about 50 percent of Hanawon’s medical budget (approximately
USD 150,000) was spent on dental work. The rest allowed the



upkeep of the new and existing facilities, implementation of
a mandatory training program for virtually all North Korean
defectors arriving in South Korea and payment of 57 faculty
members’ salaries.

——————————————————————- ———————
Hangyerae: New, but Already Crowded; Useful Stepping Stone
for North Korean Youth
——————————————————————- ———————

6. (SBU) The Ministries of Unification and Education fund a
school for defector teenagers, who in recent times have
accounted for about 17 percent of the overall defectors.
Unable to open as planned in 2003 because of opposition of
residents at various locations considered for the school,
Hangyerae finally opened in 2006 in Ansung — already home to
Hanawon resettlement center. The school was completed in
2007, fully equipped with a media room, computer lab, bakery,
auditorium, English Village, dance studio, cafeteria, and
apartment-style dorms on the top floor — modern and
high-tech, even by South Korean standards.

7. (SBU) Hangyerae now provides room and board for 280 North
Korean defector youth, who are without immediate adult family
members in South Korea. Fourteen faculty members assist the
students round-the-clock, in classrooms during the day and in
dorm rooms in the evening. On average, students spend about
a year at Hangyerae, but are permitted to stay up to two
years, as needed. According to Principal Kwak Jong-moon,
most of the students did not receive formal schooling while
en route to South Korea, often for four to five years or
longer. This prolonged period without education, coupled
with South Korean passion for academic success, meant that
North Korean teenagers faced enormous difficulty
transitioning successfully into South Korean schools.

8. (SBU) Kwak emphasized that Hangyerae was a crucial
stepping stone, adding that almost all former Hangyerae
students graduate from South Korean schools, compared with a
90 percent drop-out rate for North Korean teenagers who do
not complete the Hangyerae curriculum. National Assembly
member Kim Hack-yong (Grand National Party) whose district
included Hanawon and Hangyerae, attended the briefing at
Hangyerae School when he heard the Ambassador was visiting,
and thanked the Ambassador for her interest. Representative
Kim also noted the high quality of the facilities and
curriculum at the school.

9. (SBU) Despite the school’s impressive success rate, Kwak
said Hangyerae would soon have to turn away students if
additional funding is not available. The school is at twice
its maximum capacity and teachers’ overtime was not being
compensated. Kwak believed the students were motivated to
succeed in South Korea and this could become reality, if
given proper education and guidance.

——————————————————————- ———
ROKG Financial Support: Revised, but Still Generous
——————————————————————- ———

10. (SBU) While ROKG financial support for resettlement and
housing assistance remained generous, the ROKG has made
several revisions since 2006:

— Installments: Instead of a lump sum settlement allowance
of USD 20,000, Hanawon graduates now receive a decreased,
quarterly allowance of KRW 6 million, or about USD 4,500, for
eight quarters.

— Security Deposit: USD 10,000 security deposit for a
subsidized rental unit is no longer paid to the defector, but
deposited directly on behalf of the new resident to prevent
payment to brokers or misspending.

(NOTE: About 10,000 out of 300,000 government subsidized
units are occupied by North Korean defectors. While
localized housing provides assistance and convenience to
recent arrivals, it also causes tension between South and
North Korean residents. END NOTE.)

— Employment Bonus: This added incentive was designed to


encourage Hanawon graduates to seek employment opportunities
instead of relying on government subsidies. Free training
and monthly allowance of KWR 200,000, or approximately USD
150, is available for participants in employment training for
six months or longer. The ROKG also subsidizes companies
employing Hanawon graduates by paying 50 percent of the
wages.

——————————————————————- —————
Defector Trend: More Female Defectors; No Longer Looking for
Food but Better Life with Freedom
——————————————————————- —————
11. (SBU) The number of female defectors exceeded males in
2002 (625 females to 513 males), almost doubled in 2003 (813 
to 468), and more than tripled after that (1,533 to 485 in
2006; 1,975 to 569 in 2007; and 2,197 to 612 in 2008). Asked
why so many more female defectors arrived in South Korea than
male defectors, Hanawon Director Ko explained that women were
able to live in hiding better and longer in China, and when
caught, escaped more easily from the authorities.
Trafficking was not unusual in the ethnic-Korean Chinese
concentrated areas because many women had already left these
regions to make a better living in the ROK. North Korean
females filled a large vacuum in the marriage pool for
ethnic-Korean Chinese males, Ko said.

12. (SBU) In addition to a surge of female defectors, Ko
noted a shift toward differing motivations for defectors
starting a few years ago, in contrast to ten years ago when
defectors escaped primarily to find food. Since a few years
ago, defector groups arrived in larger numbers and most left
North Korea to seek a better, freer life in the ROK. Many
also arranged, and raised funds for, remaining family members
in North Korea to defect. Ko said that recent arrivals were
politically better informed and eager to engage in
discussions about the future of KJI and North Korea.

——————————————————————- ——————
Defector Views: Life in China Easier than in the ROK; North
Korea as an Infected Wound
——————————————————————- ——————

13. (SBU) During a roundtable discussion over lunch, five
Hanawon trainees, all women in their 30s and early 40s with
family members and children in China or North Korea, shared
their thoughts with the Ambassador, whom they said they felt
familiar with from seeing her on television speaking Korean.
Most women had spent significant amounts of time in China
before reaching the ROK, and noted that in many ways adapting
to China, with a level of development more similar to the
DPRK, was easier than adjusting to the fast-paced,
competitive life of the ROK. Several trainees added that if
there were no danger of repatriation to the DPRK by Chinese
authorities, they would have preferred to stay in China. One
said only half-jokingly that life was easier in China because
people could smoke and spit anywhere they wanted, just like
in North Korea. Others hoped for a day that North Korea
would become more like China, allowing people to keep what
they earn.

14. (SBU) The top priority for the trainees was employment,
so that they could save money, pay brokers and bring family
members out of North Korea. They were in contact with their
children in China and North Korea by phone. When asked, the
trainees spoke of hopes to become a nursery teacher, business
student, hair dresser, fashion designer and driver, some
through Hanawon employment training.


15. (SBU) Hanawon trainees who left North Korea between 2004 
and 2007 said that they left North Korea not because of lack
of food, but for a better future because “there is no future
under Kim Jong-il.” They described North Korea as an
infected internal wound about to burst where “anything is
possible with money.” Hanawon residents kept up with North
Korean news through TV and other sources and believed that
access to internet would undercut the regime the fastest.
Most had heard about KJI’s children and other aspects of his
private life for the first time after their arrival in South
Korea, as such topics were prohibited in North Korea.



16. (SBU) Four high school students who currently enrolled
in Hangyerae used to study medicine at Kim Il-sung
University. Ko interpreted this as a sign that problems
within North Korea are far more severe than anticipated. A
graduate of Kim Il-Sung University and a Hangyerae teacher,
Ko Seun-ah (protect), said separately that more students are
now coming from southern provinces in North Korea and
belonged to a higher socio-economic class.

17. (SBU) Another sign of ailing North Korea was a sharp
rise in the price of rice which had increased from NKW 700 
per kg at the time of her departure in 2005 to NKW 3,000 in
2008. Even at such a high price, nothing was available to
buy, Ko Seun-ah explained. According to regular North Korea
travelers from the diplomatic and NGO groups in Seoul, 1 kg
of rice is sold for NKW 5,000 and NKW 5,500 when grain is
available in the black market.

18. (SBU) At a separate event at Hangyerae School, about 30 
high school students participated in a discussion with the
Ambassador where, in addition to asking about U.S. views on
Korean reunification and Kim Jong Il, they showed much
interest in her experience as a Korean-speaking woman
diplomat, and in opportunities to study in the United States.
The students demonstrated a high-level of political interest
and were keen to hear about opportunities to travel and/or
study in the United States.

———-
Comment
———-

19. (SBU) The ROKG continues to provide generous financial
and institutional support for defectors, as evidenced by
Hanawon and Hangyereh, despite a considerable downsizing last
year of the Ministry of Unification, which manages most of
the defector-related programs. Still resettlement is not
easy. It was clear that most of those we spoke to find life
after Hanawon competitive and challenging, and sometimes long
for the safe zone of Hanawon or life in China before arrival
in South Korea, where they feel alienated. As the ROKG
continues to gear up for more defectors in coming years,
genuine integration of former North Korean residents in South
Korea will require more confidence by North Korean defectors
and less social discrimination by South Korean brethren.
Above all, real integration will require time.
STEPHENS

DESTINATION: ****

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000129 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2018 
TAGS: PHUM, SREF, PGOV, PROP, PREL, KS, KN
SUBJECT: FUTURE ROLE FOR NORTH KOREAN DEFECTORS
FACILITATING UNIFICATION?: ROK OFFICIALS DISMISSIVE

Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Yun. Reasons 1.4 (b/d).

1. (C) Summary: As the total number of North Korean
defectors in South Korea crossed the 15,000 threshold in
2008, some scholars, NGOs, and defectors themselves asked
whether the former North Korean residents could play a useful
role promoting change of the North Korean regime and
facilitating eventual unification of the Korean Peninsula.
While there is a nascent, but growing activism among
defectors who see themselves as naturals for these tasks,
present and past ROKG officials dismiss the possibility of a
significant defector role. Even some leading defectors
acknowledge that defectors are not yet ready to assume such a
responsibility. Defector NGO groups have grown in number,
but they are weakened by the lack of a unifying agenda or
approach to inter-Korean issues. End Summary.

2. (C) According to the ROK Ministry of Unification (MOU),
South Korea took in 2,809 North Korean defectors in 2008 —
the most ever — pushing the total number of defectors to
15,057. As the defectors are quite familiar with all things
North Korean, pundits and experts have tapped into their
information base, promoting their favored agenda and cause.
In the process, some pundits and experts, especially those
from outside Korea, see a role for the defectors to promote
change in the DPRK and, ultimately, facilitate a transition
to a unified peninsula. Scholar and long-time North Korea
observer Andrei Lankov, for example, advocates cultivation of
a cadre of North Korean defectors for such a task through
exchange programs and expanded educational support. The
International Republican Institute (IRI) has already
conducted small capacity-building workshops for defectors,
aiming to empower them both to improve their lives in South
Korea and to play a useful post-unification role at some
point in the future. Some defector activists share this
optimistic view of their future possibilities, reasoning that
their intimate personal knowledge and experience of life in
both Koreas uniquely qualifies them for a role in the
transition to unification. This argument does not appear to
hold sway, however, with many South Koreans, who tend to see
the defectors as a burden: poor, needy, and maladjusted.

——————————-
Defector NGO Overview
——————————-

3. (C) South Korean NGOs involved in DPRK-related activity
generally fall into two camps: one progressive-leaning,
humanitarian, and pro-engagement; the other conservative,
human rights-oriented, and eager to hasten the collapse of
the North Korean regime. Virtually all politically active
defectors tend to associate with, and in some cases lead,
groups in the latter category. These defector-led
organizations include radio broadcasters (Free North Korea
Radio, North Korea Reform Radio), leafleters (Fighters for
Free North Korea and Association of North Korean Defector
Organizations), human rights advocates (Committee for the
Democratization of North Korea), former prison camp internees
(Campaign for North Korean Freedom), escaped North Korean
elites (North Korean Intellectuals Solidarity), and women’s
rights advocates (Committee for North Korean Women’s Rights).
Though they share a desire to promote change in the North,
they are by no means a cohesive bunch and are often critical
of one another.

——————————————————————- ——
“Aquariums” Author Kang: Defectors Get No Respect
——————————————————————- ——

4. (C) Kang Chul-hwan, who survived one of the harshest
North Korean political prison camps and wrote about it in
“The Aquariums of Pyongyang,” estimated that defectors need
about a decade simply to assimilate into South Korean
society. Knowing South Korea and its people and
understanding its capitalist mentality were prerequisites for
assumption of any future, post-unification leadership role in
either of the Koreas, he said.

5. (C) Kang described how defectors’ status in South Korean
eyes had fallen over the years. Compared to 1992, when he
reached the ROK, recent arrivals had it “much tougher.” Back
then, defecting individuals and military officers were issued
“Defector Warrior” cards, which elicited respect and praise
from South Koreans, but in 1994 the identification cards were
“downgraded” from “Defector Warrior” status to just
“defectors.” As defector numbers and ROKG funding and
scholarships for defectors increased in the late 1990s, Kang
noticed a clear turning point in public perception of North
Korean defectors, as respect changed to disinterest to
disrespect. Since 2000, North Korean defectors have been
treated as second-class citizens, Kang said.

6. (C) While North Korean defectors were not yet ready to
“help (South) Korea,” Kang believed the defector community
could play a positive role in the future — in time and with
training. In a post-unification era, North Koreans would be
better received in the North than South Koreans in
guidance-providing roles, Kang thought.

——————————————————————- ———
IT Ph.D. Kim: Elites Ready to Make a Difference Now
——————————————————————- ———

7. (C) Apparently rejecting the notion that they are “not
yet ready” to take on the leadership role, a growing number
of defectors are trying to plant seeds of change in North
Korea now. Holder of a North Korean doctorate in information
technology, Kim Heung-kwang serves as chairman of North
Korean Intellectuals Solidarity (NKIS), a group of more than
150 elite defector intellectuals in South Korea that he
founded in October 2008, after reaching out to other educated
defectors since his arrival in 2004. Twenty percent of its
members either hold or are pursuing Master’s or Doctorate
degrees; the group aims to promote change in the DPRK by
targeting its elite class with messages and information
surreptitiously packaged in DVDs, USB thumb drives, and MP3 
files. Kim told poloffs that his attempts to solicit support
from the ROK National Intelligence Service (NIS) had not gone
well due to ideological differences and NIS leaks of
sensitive information. He had been in Japan the previous
week asking an abductee NGO for funding. Kim was featured on
the Japanese NHK BS1 evening news program “Kyou no Sekai”
(Today’s World) on January 22. His recent acceptance of a
visiting professorship at Gyeonggi University
notwithstanding, Kim, like many elite defectors, feel their
expertise, skills, and potential to effect change in the DPRK
are under-appreciated by the South. Kim closed with a plea
for U.S. funding.

———————————————-
Leafleters: Bang for the Bucks?
———————————————-

8. (C) The area of defector activity attracting the most
attention in South Korea is leafleting. NGO Fighters for
Free North Korea Chair Park Hak-sang’s fall 2008 deliveries
of large air balloons carrying several thousand anti-Kim Jong
Il leaflets (many with one-dollar bills attached) across the
DMZ drew unusually strong condemnation from the DPRK, which
demanded that the ROKG stop Park’s leafleting activities.
The ROKG’s ostensible search for a legal basis to stop the
balloons failed and Park continued, sending 100,000 “Balloon
postcards” to North Korea on December 3, 2008. The next
balloons are set to fly in February, this time laden with
North Korean won-bearing leaflets.

9. (C) Presently taking a hiatus from leafleting to comply
with ROKG wishes and to wait for more favorable spring winds,
Association of North Korean Defector Organizations (ANKDO)
leaders are also very optimistic about the potential role
that North Korean defectors could play in a post-unification
era. Conceding that the defector community is “not yet
ready” to lead, ANKDO Chairman Han Chang-kweon nevertheless
stressed that defectors would be best positioned to bring
about chane in North Korea and ought to be empowered
accordingly. ANKDO is an umbrella organization representing
28 smaller NGOs that support North Korean defectors.

—————————————-
ROK Officials Not Impressed
—————————————-

10. (C) Overall, ROK officialdom is dismissive of the
possibility of a positive unification-related role for
defectors, being more concerned with the challenges defectors
present to the South’s welfare and educational systems.
Former Unification Minister Park Jae-kyu told poloffs on
January 9 that what to do with North Korean defectors outside
Korea was a “huge problem” for the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Trade (MOFAT) and predicted that it could grow
into an even bigger headache unless the ROK changed its
current practice of universal acceptance of North Korean
defectors. Park estimated over 90 percent of defectors were
unable to adapt successfully to life in South Korea, adding
that many suffered from mental and physical health problems.
To expect this group to play a productive mid to long-term
role in Korean unification was unrealistic, he said. As
Unification Minister during the Sunshine Policy days of Kim
Dae-jung, Park had overseen implementation of a more
selective ROK policy on accepting defectors, he said.

11. (C) The South Korean public, Park continued, was
“psychologically not ready for defectors,” and was certainly
not prepared to accept them as leaders of any sort. To think
that the adjustment process would be effortless because
“defectors are also Koreans” would be a “naive and
irresponsible” notion. Informal comments made in a separate
meeting with MOU officials seemed to bear this out. North
Korean neighbors they could live with, they agreed, but they
would not stand for seeing one of their children marry one.
Deputy Foreign Minister Lee Yong-joon echoed former Minister
Park’s opinion that acceptance of virtually all defectors who
wish to settle in South Korea coupled with ROKG resettlement
incentives had attracted less desirable defectors to the ROK.

—————————————————————
Broadcasters: Kept at Arm’s Length by ROKG
—————————————————————

12. (C) Former DPRK propagandist Kim Seong-min spearheaded
development of the largest of the defector-associated
broadcasters, Free North Korea Radio (FNK), though he has
turned over responsibility for the radio portion of his
expanding operation to another defector, Lee Keum-ryong.
Employing 13 defectors and planning to increase total staff
from 15 to 20, FNK now broadcasts five hours per night and
produces over 50 different programs on everything from
current events, useful life skills, and women’s rights to
defector testimonies, statistical comparisons of the North
and South, lectures by well-known North Korea specialists,
and English and Mandarin lessons. All programs are hosted by
defectors speaking in North Korean dialect. Kim and his FNK
colleagues have branched out into other activity, too,
including an online clearinghouse of North Korea-related
information, images, and videos (some from FNK’s North Korea
contacts) called NK Information Center (www.fnkinf.com) and a
defection support operation enlisting the assistance of a
team of trusted brokers and contacts in Vietnam and Cambodia.
Ignored by mainstream South Korean press, FNK was recognized
and awarded for its work by Reporters Without Borders in
December.

13. (C) Not all have been pleased with FNK Radio’s
activities; employees discovered a “bloody axe” on the
station office’s doorstep one day and the office now receives
constant police protection. Kim claimed in a December
meeting with poloff that those responsible for sending
threatening mail to FNK in the past had since been arrested
under the National Security Law. Initially wary of the
police, Kim said he now gets along well with them and
believed that elements of the NIS approve of their
broadcasting efforts. Many who logged on to the NK
Information Center website, he noted, were from the NIS. A
female defector that worked for FNK two years ago, he said,
was in fact later recruited by the NIS, which employed other
defectors as well.

14. (C) Radio Free Chosun (RFC) president, the non-defector
conservative activist Han Ki-hong, likewise told poloff in
December that the broadcaster had close relations with the
NIS, friendlier now under President Lee Myung-bak than under
previous administrations. Also like FNK, RFC monitored
defector responses to its broadcasts and adjusted programming
content accordingly, tailoring the contents to those mostly
likely to listen in: intellectuals, students, black
marketeers. Part of a larger organization encompassing small
publisher NKnet and online North Korea news source The Daily
NK, RFC creates about 15 programs in-house on such topics as
the North Korean economic situation, stages of transition to
a new regime, music, and dramas, broadcasting for an hour and
a half per day. Ten employees worked on radio programs in one
capacity or another and RFC aimed to have defectors broadcast
70-80 percent of its programming in North Korean dialect.

15. (C) One of two other smaller, but notable, broadcasters
is North Korea Reform Radio, a two-person operation run by
1990s defector Kim Seung-chul producing 1 hour of programming
per day targeted at North Korean leadership elites. The
other is Open Radio, run by South Korean Young Howard, who
employs two or three defectors and broadcasts two hours per
day.

———-
Comment
———-

16. (C) North Korean defectors have been quite successful in
forming groups and organization to publicize repression back
home. Broadcasting is probably the most successful model,
attracting funds and interest from South Korean conservative
groups and foreign human rights and religious activists.
Understandably, these defector groups see themselves as
trailblazers and their work as preparation for leadership
roles in a unified Korea. This, however, is not a view their
southern compatriots share, who see a divided defector
community without much depth or leadership. Correct or not,
South Koreans also assume that North Koreans will not respond
well to the returnees.
STEPHENS

DESTINATION: ****

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RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1856
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 1436
RUEHBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 6426
RUEHPF/AMEMBASSY PHNOM PENH 0284
RUEHHI/AMEMBASSY HANOI 2039
RUEHGO/AMEMBASSY RANGOON 2431
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 8669
RUEHCN/AMCONSUL CHENGDU 0088
RUEHGZ/AMCONSUL GUANGZHOU 1266
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 0073
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 3249
RUEHHK/AMCONSUL HONG KONG 3058
RUEHHM/AMCONSUL HO CHI MINH CITY 0031
RUDKIA/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 0917
RUEHVK/AMCONSUL VLADIVOSTOK 1181
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J5 SEOUL KOR
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA J2 SEOUL KOR
RHMFISS/COMUSKOREA SCJS SEOUL KOR*

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SEOUL 004284 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS
SENSITIVE

E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREF, PHUM, PGOV, PREL, KTIP, KS, KN
SUBJECT: NK REFUGEES: THE QUEST FOR STABLE EMPLOYMENT

1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Finding stable employment is probably the
greatest challenge for North Koreans resettling in the ROK.
The ROKG assigns North Korean refugees to employment
officers, provides incentives, recruits employers, and
subsidizes half of North Koreans’ salaries to their employers
for two years. Many North Koreans do not take advantage of
such opportunities, however, or prefer to obtain irregular
jobs so they can continue to collect welfare payments from
the government in addition to their wages. Further, while
most North Korean refugees are from marginalized and less
educated groups, ROK law provides that educational and
professional achievements in the North will be recognized in
the ROK. In practice, however, this policy has limited value
in professional fields. END SUMMARY.

STABLE EMPLOYMENT: AN UPHILL BATTLE
—————————————————-

2. (SBU) Competing in the South Korean labor market is the
major challenge for most North Korean refugees. Like other
immigrant populations, North Koreans lack political, social,
and job skills necessary in their new home. The director of
a large non-government North Korean resettlement center told
Poloff that many North Koreans have a difficult time
adjusting to the ROK’s capitalist, free-market society. Even
if North Koreans understand capitalist principles in theory,
putting these ideas into practice is difficult for many North
Koreans, especially middle-aged refugees, who are used to
working in a controlled economy. ROK National Human Rights
Commission (NHRC) Chief Human Rights Policy Analyst Shim
Sang-don similarly asserted that, due to differences in the
economic systems, North Koreans often have a weaker work
ethic, and may face difficulties maintaining employment in
the ROK’s hard-working society. North Koreans are also
entering a competitive job market where the unemployment rate
among new entrants is 15-20 percent.

3. (SBU) Many North Koreans are from marginalized classes in
North Korea, and would have difficulties in finding “good
jobs” anywhere in the world. According to MOU statistics,
the vast majority of North Korean refugees in the ROK were
hard laborers, farmers, or homemakers in the DPRK.

4. (SBU) Even highly-educated North Koreans may find that
their achievements are worth little in the ROK. Hanawon
Career Counselor Jeon Youn-suk reported that the number of
North Korean refugees with professional degrees or
certificates has increased recently as the number of “planned
defections” among such groups has risen. Under the 1997 
Protection Act, North Koreans’ academic achievements and
qualifications are recognized in the ROK. In practice,
however, KINU Senior Research Fellow Lee Keum-soon said that
this is difficult because of the vast differences in
education and skills acquired through the North and South
Korean systems. Also, many professions credentials are
granted by private organizations (e.g., the Korean Bar
Association or Korean Medical Association) that do not
recognize such North Korean qualifications, in large part
because training in North Korea would not prepare refugees
for practicing in their fields in the ROK. In addition, some
NGOs also report that North Koreans may have difficulty in
having their credentials recognized if they lack documents to
prove their achievements. North Korea Database Center found
that only half of North Koreans who tried to have their
credentials recognized in the ROK were successful. Kookmin
University scholar Andrei Lankov argued that this group of
mid-level professionals is likely to suffer the most, but be
the most important, after unification.

5. (SBU) According to the 1997 Protection Act, the ROKG

SEOUL 00004284 002 OF 004 


offers supplementary education and retraining when refugees’
professional qualifications are not recognized. For example,
Hanawon’s Educational Director Pak Yong-sok reported that, if
North Koreans had studied medicine in the DPRK, they may be
able to enter skip the first few years of medical school in
the ROK. According to Hanawon’s Jeon, as of late November a
bill was pending before the National Assembly that would make
it easier for North Koreans to have their past achievements
recognized.

EMPLOYMENT UNDERREPORTED
————————————

6. (SBU) KINU’s Lee said that many North Koreans have
part-time or temporary jobs that they do not report so that
they can continue to receive unemployment assistance.
Estimating North Koreans’ unemployment rate is therefore
difficult; a study by North Korea Database Center estimated
unemployment at 30 percent, while KINU estimates 14.7 percent
unemployment. Other recent surveys estimate North Koreans’
unemployment between 38 and 60 percent. A study by North
Korea Database found that 75 percent of employed North
Koreans hold irregular or day jobs; 57 percent had been
employed in their current jobs less than six months; and 98 
percent had changed jobs at least once. Chang Chin-yung, an
employment assistance officer at Seoul’s Nambu Employment
Assistance Center, told poloff that many North Korean
refugees have a negative view of stable employment because
they believe that refugees who obtain irregular jobs are able
to receive more money from the government. Indeed, one older
female North Korean refugee complained to poloff that the
ROKG should change its system so that North Korean refugees
could continue to receive their unemployment payments while
working. Chang also reported that some refugees are
constantly worried about their situation due to the
instability the have faced, and fear losing their government
assistance.

HELPING NORTH KOREANS OVERCOME THE CHALLENGES
——————————————————————-

7. (SBU) As outlined in septels, the ROK provides North
Korean refugees with an employment protection officer in
their communities who helps North Koreans obtain training and
jobs. MOL also subsidizes 50 percent of North Koreans’ wages
for two years. In addition to resettlement assistance, the
ROKG provides additional incentive payments up to KRW 15.4 
million (USD 15,400) for North Koreans who complete training
programs or obtain long-term stable employment. A female
North Korean refugee who works as a housekeeper praised the
incentives for refugees maintaining employment for at least
one year. A male student refugee was less positive about the
incentive program, however, noting that it is difficult for
many North Koreans to meet the criteria necessary to receive
the incentive payments, such as maintaining a certain GPA at
University or completing a certain number of training hours.
According to MOU statistics, the number of North Korean
refugees seeking assistance in obtaining jobs increased after
introduction of the incentive program.

8. (SBU) Poloff visited the Nambu Employment Assistance
Center in Yeongdeungpo-gu, Seoul, on November 22. The large
Center, housed in a modern building, was filled with
teller-like stations where Koreans in need of employment
assistance meet with job counselors. Employment officer
Chang told Poloff that the Ministry of Labor’s (MOL) main
roles in assisting North Korean refugees are to provide
employment counseling to refugees, help refugees find
suitable employment, and provide subsidies to companies that
employ North Korean refugees. MOL has 60 employment centers

SEOUL 00004284 003 OF 004 


throughout the ROK, each of which has an officer designated
to assist North Koreans in that area. According to Chang,
employment officers do not receive lists of North Koreans in
their area because of the sensitivity of such information,
but are referred North Koreans by their welfare officers.
North Koreans may also connect with employment officers
through civil society organizations or learn of them through
advertisements of their activities.

9. (SBU) The Nambu office, which oversees three districts
that are home to 1,300 North Koreans, has been operating a
pilot program since July 2006 to provide more comprehensive
programming to North Korean refugees. The pilot program has
divided North Koreans into three groups based on the time
they have been in the ROK, but is focused primarily on
helping recent Hanawon graduates quickly obtain stable jobs
or enter job training programs. Poloff met with Chang in a
large and well-equipped conference room, which she said is
often used to host group events for North Korean refugees.
Chang said that the Nambu Center’s pilot program would be
completed in December, and the Center would complete an
evaluation and distribute a manual to other employment
centers. Because the main emphasis of the program is on
group activities, the program may not be applicable in areas
with only a small number of defectors, Chang said.

JOB TRAINING
——————

10. (SBU) Some North Koreans are interested in first
receiving job training before looking for employment, Chang
said. Hanawon career counselor Jeon told poloff that Hanawon
recently put more emphasis on job training, which now
comprises 40 percent of Hanawon’s curriculum. Since May,
Hanawon has worked closely with the MOL to develop enhanced
vocational training programs, including an exchange program
with a polytechnical school near Hanawon. This experience
allows North Koreans to gain a sense of their interests,
build confidence in their abilities, and provide the training
necessary to get better jobs, Jeon said.

11. (SBU) Chang said that there are several large job
training programs that North Korean refugees tend to be
interested in, but refugees often have a difficult time
adjusting to the classes due to educational gaps with their
South Korean peers. MOL and the Nambu Center are therefore
working to develop training programs tailored for North
Korean refugees. NK Net President Han Ki-hong argued that
that job-training programs are focused narrowly on vocational
and computer skills. The ROK should also provide programs
and incentives for North Koreans to learn English and other
skills, Han said.

ENTERING THE WORKING WORLD
—————————————

12. (SBU) Some North Koreans want to immediately obtain a job
without receiving additional job training. Hanawon’s Jeon
said that skilled jobs are difficult to obtain, and because
many North Koreans want to obtain jobs right away, they often
end-up with blue collar jobs. When North Koreans are ready
to seek employment, Chang said that MOL tries to match
refugees to employers based on their interests and abilities.
Chang reported that the Employment Center conducts outreach
to companies to encourage them to hire North Korean refugees.
She said that many companies are hesitant to employ North
Korean refugees because they do not have any experience with
them, not because they are North Koreans. North Korea
Database found that of North Koreans believe South Korean
employers refrain from employing them for several reasons: 34 

SEOUL 00004284 004 OF 004 


percent cited prejudice; 29 percent identified differences in
ability compared to South Korean colleagues; 29 percent said
because their background from North Korea is not relevant;
and 6.5 percent identified a preference for South Korean or
foreign workers.

13. (SBU) Chang said that the Center provides employers with
information to address any prejudices against refugees that
employers might have. As part of its pilot program, the
Center holds events for North Korean refugees and prospective
employers so that employers can identify potential employees.
The Center also accompanies North Koreans to job interviews,
and encourages companies to conduct interviews at the Center
to help North Koreans feel more comfortable.

14. (SBU) Finding a full-time job is only half the battle,
however, as Chang reported that many North Koreans quit their
jobs without any notice. In the past, many North Koreans
also were not very hard-working, Chang said. In recent
years, however, more refugees are diligent and work very
hard, which is helping to improve employers’ image of North
Koreans. Chang also noted that many North Koreans face
difficulties in the workplace due to poor health. North
Korea Database found that 24 percent of North Koreans
identified health problems as a reason for difficulty at work
(13 percent said lack of ability, 14 percent cited difficult
relationships with co-workers, 16 percent cited low wages of
lack of benefits, 2 percent cited unfairness in promotions,
and 16 percent identified no problems).

15. (SBU) Many companies that hire North Korean refugees also
employ foreign workers, and some refugees may quit because of
poor working conditions, Chang said. The employment office
encourages North Korean refugees to report problems with
working conditions or discrimination to their employment
officer, but Chang said that in most cases refugees quit
their jobs before informing the employer or employment office
of problems.

16. (SBU) To try to prevent problems with job discrimination
or poor working conditions, the MOL requires employers who
hire refugees to renew their government assistance agreement
every three months, according to Chang. Chang said that MOL
also tries to help North Koreans obtain jobs with companies
that are members of the ROK’s general insurance program. She
reported that employment officers also follow-up with
refugees once they obtain jobs to ensure that they are being
treated properly. Chang said that, because the MOL provides
subsidies to companies who employ North Korean refugees for
their salaries, employment officers also check periodically
with the companies and refugees to ensure that the refugees
are still employed at the companies receiving those benefits.


17. (SBU) While experience with refugees who quit suddenly
makes some employers hesitant to hire refugees, Chang
believed positive signs are starting to show, with more
employers now willing to hire North Korean refugees. Still,
MOU statistics indicate that more North Koreans are looking
for jobs than the number of companies willing to hire them.
As of June 2006, only 400 North Koreans had obtained regular
jobs for which the ROKG paid employment subsidies, while the
majority were employed in blue-collar jobs.
VERSHBOW

*This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

*

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002120 

SIPDIS

PDAS RICHARD GREENE, PRM FOR DAS RYAN, PRM/A RUSCH, PRM/A
SHEEHAN,

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016 
TAGS: PHUM, PREF, TH, KN, KS, North Korea (DPRK), Refugee
SUBJECT: EMBASSY BANGKOK NORTH KOREAN RESPONSE PLAN

REF: (A) SUTTON/RAPSON E-MAIL 4/7/06 (B) RAPSON/ADLER
E-MAIL 4/7/06 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON. REASON: 1.4 (C)

1. (U) This is an action request. Please see action
request para 6.

2. (C) Summary: Deputy Chief of Mission and Political
Counselor, along with a team of USG members who will have a
role in assisting NKs at the Embassy, met on April 10 to
discuss details of the walk-in operational plan. The Embassy
NK response team has been briefed to respond to the
situation in varying case scenarios. Post requests PRM
assistance in providing the — Statement Concerning the U.S.
Refugee Admissions Program — in Korean and English as soon
as possible, authorizing IOM expenditure to house NKs, and
sending TDY Korean speakers for translation. The Thai
“Songkran” New Year holiday is a week-long celebration. Most
RTG government offices, businesses, international
organizations and embassies, including AmEmbassy Bangkok,
will be close on Thursday, April 13 and Friday, April 14 and
it may be difficult to contact the RTG and the ROK during
this period. End summary.

3. (C) USG NORTH KOREAN (NK) RESPONSE TEAM PREPARATIONS

A. The RSO and local guards are briefed and prepared
to direct and speak to NKs at a comfortable location
to the side of the Embassy main gate. Taking into
consideration rain and heat the location is sheltered
and shaded. Water will be available. Guards will be
provided with Korean-language cards to assist NKs
until Embassy interpreter arrives on the scene.

B. Post has identified USG interpreters and they
will be able to assist over the holiday. UNHCR also offered
assistance from their ROK-seconded Korean speaker if
required.

C. Media issues: Embassy PAO will address any media
issues that arise and has prepared talking points. Safe house
management and staff have been instructed to refer all media
inquires to PAO.

D. Embassy NK response team has been briefed on
transport arrangements to safehouse. Thai language taxi
cards directing NK to safe house are available. If needed,
Embassy personnel will accompany NKs to safe house.

E. Safe house options: IOM has reserved space at a
guesthouse relatively close to the Embassy. The safe house
will provide NKs with food and other supplies during their
residence. Guesthouse staff has experience in housing
transit refugees en route to a resettlement country.

F. UNHCR will be open on Friday, April 14 and have
personnel on stand-by to visit NKs at the safe house in order
to issue them UNHCR POC protection letter, if required, and
begin process of resettlement country referral.

G. All USG officers present have been issued each
other’s cell phone numbers and are on standby to respond if
this issue arises over the Thai holiday weekend.

4. (C) THAI NEW YEAR HOLIDAY PERIOD

The Thai “Songkran” New Year holiday is a week-long
celebration. Consequently, most RTG government offices,
businesses, international organizations and embassies,
including AmEmbassy Bangkok, will be closed on Thursday,
April 13 and Friday, April 14 and will re-open again on
Monday, April 17th. Due to internal planning and direct
coordination with UNHCR and IOM, Post is prepared for NK
refugees during this holiday period. Embassy NK response
team members have been instructed to be as forward leaning as
possible in dealing with this group. However, given that it
is a major holiday in Thailand, it may be difficult to
contact the RTG and the ROK during this period. It should be
expected that coordination may be slower over the holiday
than the normal work week.

5. (C) MINIMAL MEDIA ATTENTION DESIRED

Post emphasizes the need for minimal media attention and
request PRM to inform the NGO group who may be accompanying
NKs to Bangkok to discourage media coverage. Any media
attention may jeopardize the existing NK resettlement program
to South Korea in not just Thailand but other countries where
NK seek refuge. Considering the RTG and ROK’s sensitivities
on this matter, it is crucial that USG assistance to NK
refugee proceeds as discreetly as possible.

6. (C) ACTION REQUEST FOR PRM.

Post requests from PRM the Korean translation of the
Statement Concerning the U.S. Refugee Admission program as
soon as possible. UNHCR is briefed on the statement content
and will require both language copies to forward to NKs to
ensure that they are accurately informed of their
resettlement options. Additionally, if NKs are to use IOM’s
safe house arrangement, IOM has requested that PRM issue a
document authorizing IOM’s expenditure on room and board for
their accounting purposes. A cost breakdown can be provided
if required, but it is estimated to cost approximately 20 USD
per person per day. Three meals a day are included in this
estimate. Lastly, Post request TDY Korean speaker support to
interpret for NKs in foreseeable resettlement interviews and
processing to the U.S.

BOYCE

DESTINATION: **06STATE33786**

*This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

*

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001340 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2016 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PHUM, KN, TH, Refugee, North Korea (DPRK)
SUBJECT: THAI RESPONSE ON NORTH KOREAN REFUGEES

REF: STATE 33786 

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR BOYCE, REASONS 1.4 (B, D).

1. (C) Summary. During March 3 conversations, Thai FM
Kantathi and NSC Chief Winai said that the North Korean
refugee issue was sensitive for Thailand. However, they
indicated that the RTG was willing to work with the USG on
discreet, case-by-case processing of North Korean refugees
for U.S. resettlement. This represents a welcome shift of
the Thai position, but one that needs to be treated with some
caution given the uncertain political future of the Thaksin
government. End summary.

2. (C) Per reftel, Ambassador met March 3 with Foreign
Minister Kantathi on North Korean refugees. Ambassador also
took the opportunity to raise the issue of the missing Hmong
minors (septel). Prior to the meeting, and per reftel,
Refcoord contacted ROK Embassy Counselor Hong-Kyun Kim and
stated that the Embassy had received instructions to approach
the RTG on North Korean refugees and hoped the ROK Embassy
would inform the RTG, if approached, that it had no ojections
to the planned U.S. strategy on this issue.

3. (C) Ambassador told Kantathi that the North Korea Human
Rights Act requires the USG to facilitate the resettlement of
qualified North Korean refugees to the United States. The
United States recognized that this issue was sensitive for
Thailand and appreciated that the Thai had done a good job of
quietly facilitating the movement of North Koreans to South
Korea. The United States did not want to do anything that
might negatively affect the current situation. At the same
time, the United States thought there might be cases for
which U.S. resettlement would be appropriate. The United
States did not know of any such cases now, but if one arose
would cooperate with UNHCR and the ROK in determining bona
fides and carrying out the other usual steps of U.S. refugee
processing. If the United States found that a refugee was
ineligible for U.S. resettlement, the ROK had said that it
would nevertheless accept the person. The Ambassador urged
the Foreign Minister to permit U.S. processing of North
Korean refugees and allow them to depart for the United
States if found eligible.

4. (C) Kantathi responded that Thailand permits South Korea
to process and resettle North Koreans quietly. The Thai had
also worked successfully with the ROK when some North Koreans
had entered the Thai Embassy in Hanoi. He said that he had
heard that North Korean refugees had found it hard to
integrate into South Korea. It seemed the United States was
now prepared to give the “green light.” Kantathi asked if
the United States was most interested in getting access. The
Ambassador replied that we wanted to process North Korean
refugees for resettlement to the United States and briefly
described the steps of the process. The Ambassador again
urged Kantathi to allow the U.S. to move ahead with this
initiative.

5. (C) Kantathi said this issue was sensitive for Thailand.
He noted that the North Koreans had targetted Embassies in
Beijing but the Chinese had been successful in cutting off
that option by strengthening security in the diplomatic
quarter. Now the North Koreans followed a route that took
them through Yunnan Province and down the Mekong River.
Thailand had heard that there were 30,000-40,000 North
Koreans around the region outside of their country. The Thai
government was worried about a pull factor and did not want
to encourage the North Koreans to come to Thailand. It would
be best if North Koreans could be processed for resettlement
with UNHCR assistance in China. Kantathi also stated that
Thailand’s relations with North Korea were sensitive. He
cited the issue of the Thai woman who had apparently been
abducted many years ago by the North Koreans and whose case
came to light after Robert Jenkins left North Korea. The
Thai government had raised her case, unsuccessfully so far,
with the DPRK. It would continue to pursue the issue,
however, and might work with the Japanese and Chinese to
achieve a satisfactory result. The North Korean government
was very difficult, Kantathi said.

6. (C) Kantathi then said that, personally speaking, the RTG
could work with the USG on the U.S. resettlement of North
Koreans on a discreet, case-by-case basis. He emphasized
that the process must be discreet. He also requested that
the USG explore the possibility of resettlement processing
with the PRC. The Ambassador thanked Kantathi for this
response.

7. (C) Following the discussion with Kantathi, the Ambassador
telephoned General Winai Phattiyakul, the head of the Thai
National Security Council. The Ambassador made similar
points to Winai about U.S. intentions and strong desire to
process North Korean refugees for U.S. resettlement. The
Ambassador relayed the response of FM Kantathi and asked if
Winai had the same position. Winai responded that the normal
Thai practice was to send North Korean refugees to South
Korea. Then moving off the stance he had previously taken,
Winai responded that if the USG was willing and able to
process North Korean refugees, it would probably be possible
to work something out.
8. (C) Comment. This is a welcome response from the Thai
government and a shift of the previous Thai position. The
current uncertain political situation and the possibility
that Thaksin may not remain in power means that the Thai
response should be taken with some caution. End comment.

BOYCE

This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

*

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001139 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, TH, KS, KN, North Korea (DPRK), Refugee
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY ON NORTH KOREAN

REFUGEES

REF: A. SEOUL 471 
B. STATE 4712 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN SUTTON, REASON 1.4 (d).

1. (C) Summary. In a February 23 meeting, a South Korean
Embassy official said he had received no new instructions or
information from Seoul regarding U.S.-ROK discussions about
North Korean refugees, including on providing assistance to
the Embassy if any suitable refugee cases arose or sharing
information on North Korean refugees who wanted U.S.
resettlement. The official raised familiar concerns that
U.S. resettlement processing of North Korean refugees in
Thailand would lead to a surge in North Koreans coming to
Thailand and endanger the existing pipeline to the ROK. He
also speculated that if the United States resettled North
Koreans from Thailand, the DPRK might charge that the United
States was abducting its citizens and cite that as an excuse
not to participate in the Six-Party talks. End summary.

2. (C) Political Counselor and Refcoord met informally on
February 23 with Counsellor Hong-Kyn Kim of the South Korean
Embassy to discuss the North Korean refugee issue. Kim will
shortly be leaving Thailand to work in Seoul as one of the
special assistants to the ROK Foreign Minister.

3. (C) Political Counselor noted that the USG had recently
told the ROK government that it would continue to push ahead
on resettling a small number of North Korean refugees in the
United States. To that end, the USG would be trying to
overcome the resistance of asylum countries, including
Thailand, to permitting U.S. resettlement processing of North
Koreas. If suitable cases were found, we would also be
looking for some assistance from the ROK. Political
Counselor asked Kim for an updated assessment of the North
Korean refugee situation in Thailand and whether Seoul had
passed on any new instructions or information.

4. (C) Somewhat surprisingly, Kim responded that he had
received no new instructions or information from Seoul
regarding U.S.-ROK discussions on North Korean refugees,
including on the provision of assistance for suitable cases
or sharing information on North Korean refugees who wanted to
resettle in the United States. He added, however, that the
ROK Embassy would naturally follow any instructions that
Seoul might provide.

5. (C) Kim then raised the familiar concern that USG
processing of North Korean refugees in Thailand could
endanger the pipeline to the ROK and said that the USG should
not do anything that might disturb the existing system. He
asked whether the USG had considered Mongolia as an
alternative location, noting that the Mongolian government
seemed more forthcoming generally on this issue than
Thailand. (Comment: In ref a, MOFAT DG Kim took a different
tact, stating that a USG refugee resettlement initiative in
Mongolia could lead the Mongolians to shut down the pipeline
to South Korea and thereby end that country’s status as a
particularly important transit point for North Korean
refugees. End comment.) Counsellor Kim stated that word
spreads rapidly among the NGOs and brokers involved with
North Korean refugees and it would quickly become known that
the USG was processing North Korean refugees in Thailand. He
predicted that the number of North Korean refugees would
surge since it was already relatively easy for them to travel
here. They would test the USG to see how many refugees it
would take.

6. (C) Kim continued that the Thai government was already
concerned about the increasing number of North Korean
refugees coming to Thailand. He noted a recent press report
in which a northern Thai police official had said that the
Thai government was worried about the trend and would bolster
its police presence in the areas where the North Koreans
crossed the border. He expressed confidence, however, that
the Thai government would not take steps to stop the existing
pipeline to South Korea. Apart from the higher numbers that
were moving through the pipeline this year, Kim said there
were no changes in how the system was working. It was now
taking about 2 months on average for North Korean refugees to
be processed in Bangkok before they were moved on to the ROK.


7. (C) Kim raised another concern about U.S. refugee
processing of North Koreans in Thailand. He said he believed
the DPRK had never approached the Thai goverment regarding
the existing pipeline. However, if the United States were to
start taking North Korean refugees from Thailand, Kim said
this would likely change. The DPRK would raise the issue
with the Thai. In addition, the DPRK might charge that the
U.S. was abducting North Koreans and use that as an excuse
not to participate in the Six-Party talks.
BOYCE

DESTINATION: **05BANGKOK5627**

*This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

*

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 007184 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TH, North Korea (DPRK)
SUBJECT: EXCELLENT THAI-DPRK RELATIONS NOT SO USEFUL IN
ABDUCTION CASE

REF: BANGKOK 005627 

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN M. SUTTON FOR REASON 1.4 (B,D)

1. (C) Summary. Allegations in a new book that North Korean
abducted a Thai woman working in Macao in 1978 have grabbed
local headlines and prompted Foreign Minister Kantathi to
pledge government efforts to return her to Thailand. Thai
officials, however, are finding their North Korean
counterparts less than helpful on the case, but this issue is
unlikely to derail Prime Minister Thaksin’s planned visit to
Pyongyang next year. End Summary.

ALLEGED DPRK ABDUCTION OF THAI IN 1978 
———————————————————

2. (SBU) U.S. Army deserter and former North Korean resident
Charles Robert Jenkins’ Japanese language book “Kokuhaku”
(“To Tell the Truth”) alleges that he knew a Thai woman who
had been abducted by DPRK authorities in the 1970’s and
forced to marry a fellow U.S. Army deserter. This revelation
has grabbed local headlines (Note, the Nation newspaper has
run almost daily stories. End Note) and prompted pressure on
the RTG to make good on its broad pledge to protect Thai
citizens abroad.

3. (SBU) Based on Thai Embassy Tokyo’s meetings with Jenkins
and a review of missing persons cases from the 1970’s, Thai
officials believe that the woman in question is Anocha
Panjoy, a Thai national who went missing in 1978 shortly
after arriving in Macao to work. Her brother has been in
close contact with Thai authorities and Japanese NGO’s
involved in the abduction issue.

SURPRISE! DPRK NOT SO HELPFUL
——————————————-

4. (C) MFA officials told Poloff on 17 November that they
have met with North Korean diplomats to discuss this case,
but that the DPRK Embassy here denies having any knowledge of
Anocha. RTG officials are assiduously avoiding any
discussion of the “abduction,” and in their dealing with the
North Koreans, refer to the issue as a “missing persons case”
so as not to offend their interlocutors. That said, Thai
officials are hoping that their repeated requests for further
information checks—in the form of daily phone calls to the
DPRK mission here—may yet produce some results. Given the
heavy press play, both the Foreign Minister and the Prime
Minister are personally interested in this case. When asked
if this issue could impede PM Thaksin’s planned trip to
Pyongyang next year (ref) MFA officials said “not really.”

COMMENT
———-

5. (C) RTG officials make much of their “excellent relations”
with Pyongyang, often in an attempt to involve themselves in
such issues as the six-party talks. This case may highlight
how unhelpful the DPRK can be, even with “friends,” but it
appears that this will not affect Thaksin’s North Korea
policy.
BOYCE

DESTINATION: **05SEOUL444|05STATE13599|05VIENTIANE128**

*This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

*

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANGKOK 000802 

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, PRM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/31/2015 
TAGS: PREF, PREL, PHUM, ASEC, KS, KN, TH, Refugee, Asylum, LAOS, North Korea (DPRK)
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR-FM SURAKIART ON NORTH KOREAN ASYLUM
SEEKER IN VIENTIANE

REF: A. STATE 13599 
B. VIENTIANE 128 
C. SEOUL 444 
D. EMBASSY VIENTIANE (BAUER) JANUARY 31 E-MAIL TO
EMBASSY BANGKOK (ARVIZU)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason: 1.4 (d)

1. (C) On January 28, while in Phuket for Thai-hosted
conference on a tsunami early warning system (EWS), the
Ambassador spoke with Foreign Minister Surakiart about Ahn
Kyong Su, the North Korean asylum seeker in Embassy
Vientiane. The Ambassador noted that the Lao government
would not allow transit to Thailand for onward travel to
South Korea using a commercial flight from Vientiane, and
insisted that the North Korean could only cross the border
into Thailand by land. He urged Thai flexibility on the land
option. Surakiart said that he was aware of the Ambassador’s
earlier approach to MFA Permanent Secretary Krit
Garnjana-Goonchorn and had been updated regularly on
working-level discussions and developments by his staff.

2. (C) At first Surakiart asked why the USG did not press the
Lao harder on the air option and even offered to call
himself. After the Ambassador told him that the Lao
government had not yielded after several approaches and
clearly would not budge, Surakiart indicated that Thailand
would agree to land passage as long as the North Korean is
properly documented by the ROK and taken directly from Nong
Khai to Udorn, and then flown to Bangkok airport for
immediate travel onwards.

3. (C) Per Ref D, FM Surakiart has instructed the Thai
Ambassador in Vientiane to convey to Embassy Vientiane and
the Lao Government that Thailand will allow Anh to enter
Thailand via land as long as the conditions are met. The
next critical step would appear for the ROK to issue Anh the
proper travel documents either in Vientiane or elsewhere so
that they can be passed to him on the Friendship Bridge
between Laos and Thailand. In addition, it would be best if
the ROK would agree to take custody of Anh at the Friendship
Bridge, transport him to Bangkok for his onward travel to
Seoul, and coordinate with the Thai Government as necessary
on these arrangements. We stand ready to assist.
BOYCE

2009-06-17 06:45:00

Date 2009-06-17 06:45:00

Source Embassy Beijing

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BEIJING 001634

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2034
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PGOV, CH, KN, KS, J
SUBJECT: CDA AND MFA ASIAN AFFAIRS ON DPRK

Classified By: Charge d’Affaires, a.i., Dan Piccuta. Reasons 1.4 (b/d
).

Summary

1. (C) In a June 16 luncheon in honor of visiting Hong Kong CG Joe Donovan hosted by the Charge, –––– –––– ––––  –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– said that China liked a U.S. proposal described by Ambassador Bosworth here on June 5 to put all issues related to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula into a package for negotiation. –––– maintained that the United States holds the key to bringing the DPRK back to the negotiation table and suggested that succession concerns in North Korea might be causing Kim Jong-il to escalate tensions with the United States so that his successor, perhaps Kim Jong-un, could then step in to ease pressure. –––– acknowledged that China experts believe the DPRK has been processing highly enriched uranium but asserted that the program was only in an initial phase. –––– suggested that ROK envoy to the Six-Party Talks had not offered any new ideas during his June 9 visit to Beijing and that Japan’s focus on the abductee issue continued to cause
concerns at the MFA. End Summary.

Chinese Protests to DPRK Have Had No Effect
—————————————————————-

2. (C) In a June 16 luncheon hosted by the Charge, –––– ––––  –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– made clear that the PRC viewed recent provocative actions by the DPRK as having gone too far. He assured the Charge that Chinese officials had expressed Chinese displeasure to North Korean counterparts and had pressed the DPRK to return to the negotiation table. Unfortunately, –––– added, those protests had had “no effect.” “The only country that can make
progress with the North Koreans is the United States,” he maintained. –––– said that, although China had assured North Korean leaders that the United States was ready to have bilateral talks with them, the North Koreans had insisted that any message from the United States to the DPRK should be delivered directly, not through China. –––– took this as further evidence that only by having direct talks with the United States would North Korea return to the Six-Party Talks.

China Likes a Package Approach
———————————————

3. (C) –––– told the Charge that China viewed favorably the USG proposal of putting all facets of a possible Korean Peninsula denuclearization agreement into one package. –––– characterized Chinese and U.S. core interests in a nuclear free Korean Peninsula as “shared.” He reminded his hosts that Punggye, the site of the DPRK nuclear test, was near the Chinese border and that any accident there could have had dire consequences for Northeast China. –––– insisted that China was as concerned as the United States about proliferation from North Korea. The only difference in the China and U.S. positions, –––– maintained, was “the United States was the key while China was only in a position to apply a little oil to the lock.”

Building Trust
———————

4. (C) –––– cautioned that building trust between the DPRK and the United States would be difficult. In North Korea’s view, –––– explained, the destruction of its nuclear capability was an irreversible step while decisions by the United States could be easily reversed. When CGs Donovan and Goldberg both pointed out that trust was a two-way street and that North Korea had not evinced a great deal of it, –––– was evasive. When pressed whether he believed the DPRK had been reprocessing highly enriched uranium (HEU), –––– said yes, adding that Chinese experts believed the enrichment was only in its initial phases and that any DPRK HEU program would not be “very useful.”

Domestic Concerns in North Korea Influence Talks
——————————————————————- —-

5. (C) –––– suggested that domestic politics in North Korea were in a large way responsible for Pyongyang’s recent actions. He was dismissive of DPRK justifications for the nuclear test as a response to the UN Security Council

BEIJING 00001634 002 OF 002

Presidential Statement critical of North Korea’s April 5 Taepo-Dong 2 launch. “Kim Jong-il was obviously planning the nuclear test at the same time as the missile launch so his justification for the test makes no sense,” –––– said. –––– opined that the rapid pace of provocative actions in North Korea was due to Kim Jong-il’s declining health and might be part of a gambit under which Kim Jong-il would escalate tensions with the United States so that his successor, presumably Kim Jong-un, could then step in and ease those tensions.

6. (C) –––– ––––, –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––  –––– ––––, –––– –––– –––– ––––, told the Charge that he kept abreast of Western media reports about North Korea. –––– cautioned that U.S. experts should not assume North Korea would implode after Kim Jong-il’s death. He said that PRC analysts concluded that the regime would still function normally and discounted strongly any suggestion that the system would collapse once Kim Jong-il disappeared. ROK has no new ideas - Japan can only scuttle talks
——————————————————————- ———

7. (C) –––– said that ROK Six-Party Talks envoy Wi Sung-lac had met with VFM Wu Dawei on June 9 but had offered nothing new. “The South Koreans have plenty of ideas, but we’ve heard them all before,” he complained, adding that the ROK government was too close to the situation in North Korea to be objective. Turning to Japan, –––– said that Japan’s obsession with the abductee issue reminded him of a Chinese expression for an individual who was too weak to make something work, yet strong enough to destroy it.

Participants
——————-

Charge Dan Piccuta
Joe Donovan, U.S. Consul General Hong Kong
Robert Goldberg, Consul General Guangzhou
Mark Lambert, Regional Unit Chief
Jim Brown, interpreter

–––– ––––, –––– –––– –––– ––––
–––– ––––, ––––, –––– –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––
–––– ––––, ––––, –––– ––––, –––– –––– –––– ––––
–––– ––––, ––––, –––– –––– ––––
–––– ––––, ––––, –––– –––– –––– –––– ––––
PICCUTA

Destination

VZCZCXRO0731
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC
DE RUEHBJ #1634/01 1680645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 170645Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC

• DPRK
• North Korea
• denuclearization
• Chinese protests
• kim jong-il
• Six Party Talks
• Japan
• abductee
• an individual who was too weak to make something work yet strong enough to destroy it.

Wednesday, 29 April 2009, 13:30

Wednesday, 29 April 2009, 13:30

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MOSCOW 001108 
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/29/2019 
TAGS PREL, RU, UNSC, KNNP, KN
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN SIX PARTY NEGOTIATOR URGES PATIENCE ON
NORTH KOREA
Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Alice G. Wells for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)

Summary

1. Russian Ambassador-at-Large for to the six-party talks, Grigoriy Logvinov, admits that Moscow has limited influence with the regime, as shown by a recent visit by its foreign minister. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
2. Read related article

1. (C) Summary. Amidst escalating threats from Pyongyang in response to UN Security Council actions against its April 5 missile launch, Russian Ambassador-at-Large for Six-Party Talks Grigoriy Logvinov during an April 28 meeting urged the U.S. and the other Six-Party partners to remain patient. Reporting that Foreign Minister Lavrov had a difficult trip to North Korea that did not reveal any flexibility in DPRK’s position, he assessed that Pyongyang was hunkering down for a succession crisis, while seeking to use Yongbyon’s disablement reversal as a bargaining chip for further concessions in the Six-Party talks. Lamenting that no one had good ideas on how to pull North Korea back from its brinkmanship, Logvinov asked for additional consultations with the U.S., particularly on the time it would take for Pyongyang to reassemble its plutonium reprocessing capabilities. In Logvinov’s view, the Six-Party partners should use the intervening time to engage in quiet diplomacy to persuade North Korea to return to the negotiating table, though it is possible that we may have to wait until the succession crisis has passed before seeing a softening of North Korea’s position. End Summary.

A Rough Trip

——————

2. (C) In an April 28 meeting, Ambassador-at-Large Grigoriy Logvinov characterized Foreign Minister Lavrov’s April 23-24 trip to Pyongyang as “rough.” Logvinov conveyed that the North Korean leadership was “very angry” and told Lavrov categorically that it was resolved to restart its nuclear program, would never participate in the Six-Party Talks again, and would not trust anything but nuclear deterrence as its security guarantee. In contrast to his 2004 trip, Lavrov did not get a meeting with Kim Jong-Il. Logvinov speculated that the reason could be due to either Kim’s poor health or North Korean displeasure at the GOR’s support for the UNSC Presidential Statement and sanctions.

3. (C) Indicating that FM Lavrov would be sending personal letters to his Six-Party counterparts regarding his trip, Logvinov urged the U.S. to show patience and not overreact to the latest developments. In his view, Pyongyang’s hard line position was either a negotiating tactic or an indication that a power transition was near, but in any case did not represent the final word on the denuclearization issue. Referring directly to Japan, Logvinov warned that if countries were to press for additional UNSC action, it would only provoke the DPRK into further brinkmanship and prove counterproductive.

Wait Out the Succession Crisis

———————————————

4. (C) Elaborating on his assessment that a power transition was near, Logvinov hypothesized that Pyongyang was being particularly intransigent because it wanted to demonstrate strength to the outside world and mask the power struggle occurring internally. Recalling the political instability around the time of Stalin and Mao’s deaths, he indicated Moscow understood the possible fallout of a North Korean succession scenario because “we have seen this before.” While noting that Kim Jong-Il appeared to be functioning, if impaired, Logvinov speculated that as long as the “Dear Leader” was technically alive, he could remain the face of a charismatic leadership. Others, whether it’s his son or brother-in-law, could wield the power behind the scenes. Should Kim die, however, these people would have to emerge from the shadows and establish their own authority to rule, in which case the situation could become quite unstable. According to Logvinov, the GOR did not have a clear picture of the role the North Korean military would play in a succession crisis, nor did it know what importance to attach to the increased prominence of the military in the official press. Logvinov mused that a collective leadership arrangement might be a more stable option during a North Korean succession scenario.

5. (C) In Logvinov’s personal view, nothing was likely to induce North Korea to abandon its current course and return to the negotiating table until the succession crisis passed. The only thing the Six-Party partners could do in the meantime, he stressed, was to wait out the power transition

MOSCOW 00001108 002 OF 003

while preventing Pyongyang from further wrongdoing. The previous goals of completing a verification protocol and finishing Phase II as soon as possible were unachievable for the time being.

Or Wait Until DPRK Restarts Yongbyon

——————————————————

6. (C) Logvinov did not rule out the possibility that North Korea, in an attempt to “sell” its nuclear capabilities a third time, would seek negotiations once it reversed the disablement of the Yongbyon nuclear facilities. The GOR hoped that Pyongyang’s stated intention to restart plutonium reprocessing was a negotiating ploy, rather than a real determination to reopen its nuclear program. In Logvinov’s view, the DPRK’s dire economic situation was affecting the military programs despite the disproportionate share of resources poured into them. Derisively calling the missile the North Koreans tested “a piece of junk that miraculously flew,” he wondered if Pyongyang truly had the capability to restart reprocessing plutonium given Yongbyon’s dilapidated condition. Recalling the estimate by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that it would take the North Koreans three to six months to reverse fully Yongbyon’s disablement, Logvinov asked for consultations with U.S. experts on a more definitive assessment of time frame, stating that the Six-Party partners should use the intervening period to engage in quiet diplomacy to pull Pyongyang back from brinkmanship.

7. (C) Should the North Koreans decide to seek negotiations after reversing disablement, Logvinov saw several complications ahead. First, Pyongyang would likely demand a higher price for resuming the Six-Party Talks, which in his view could include a light water reactor and the exclusion of Japan from the talks as punishment for Tokyo’s high profile role in pressing for UNSC action. Even the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea and the dissolution of the U.S. alliances in Northeast Asia could be among the DPRK conditions. Second, the Six Party partners should not agree to be blackmailed that way, especially with regard to paying again for Yongbyon’s disablement, and would need to secure DPRK agreement to restart from where the process had left off. Third, Pyongyang’s disablement reversal would be a clear violation of UNSCR 1718. Whether the Security Council should take action would be an awkward question, as doing so could provide North Korea into further belligerent action. And lastly, North Korea’s blatant disregard of the principles of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) posed challenges to efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime as the international community prepared for next year’s NPT review conference.

No One Knows What to Do

———————————-

8. (C) In Logvinov’s view, none of the Six-Party partners currently had good ideas on ways forward. He shared that during Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi’s just concluded April 26-27 visit to Moscow, the Russian and Chinese sides discussed North Korea in general without putting forward specific proposals. Lavrov and Yang reaffirmed their common positions on the need for patience and restraint, and agreed that the Six-Party Talks must continue. Similarly, the MFA had prepared briefing material on North Korea for Prime Minister Putin’s May 11 trip to Japan, but it too “contained nothing special.” One prerequisite for jump starting the negotiations again, in Logvinov’s view, was the Six-Party readiness to fulfill immediately the Phase II economic assistance obligations.

9. (C) Logvinov stressed the importance the MFA placed on consultations with the U.S. on North Korea, and in this regard expressed appreciation for Ambassador Sung Kim’s phone call last week that helped him to provide FM Lavrov a fuller brief for his Pyongyang trip. While welcoming a possible visit by Special Envoy Bosworth to Moscow in the next week, he asked that the U.S. come prepared with proposals or views on the next steps. “We shared our views in Seoul. Now we are ready to hear from our American friends,” he stated, referring to the March 7 initial meeting between Ambassador Bosworth and Deputy Foreign Minister Borodavkin in South Korea. He also expressed the view that should the Six-Party partners succeed in persuading North Korea to return to the talks, the U.S. should not continue to insist on completing a

MOSCOW 00001108 003 OF 003

verification protocol as it would be untimely given the changed circumstances. BEYRLE

• Six party talks
• DPRK
• North Korea
• denuclearization
• succession
• Stalin
• Mao
• No One Knows What to Do

Monday, 27 April 2009, 06:35

Monday, 27 April 2009, 06:35
C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 000672 
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 04/27/2019 
TAGS PGOV, KN, KS
SUBJECT: MND: DPRK MILITARY RHETORIC AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
COMMISSION CHANGES ARE ABOUT SUCCESSION
Classified By: POL M/C Joseph Y. Yun. Reasons 1.4(b/d)

Summary

1. South Korean military officials tell the Americans that North Korea’s aggressive behaviour and its other policy steps must be set in the context of a potential succession struggle as Kim Jong-il’s grip on power weakens. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
2. Read related article

1. (C) SUMMARY: The DPRK’s recent restaffing and expansion of the National Defense Commission (NDC) and its hostile military rhetoric over the last several months are related to the DPRK leadership’s “top priority” need to stabilize the DPRK internally in preparation for succession, according to Colonel Lee Sang-chul, Ministry of National Defense North Korea Policy Division Director and lead ROKG representative to Colonel-level military-to-military talks in October 2008. A second priority was to achieve improved relations with the United States, which the DPRK regards as its only potential security guarantor, ironically. END SUMMARY.

———————————————-

Military Statements and the NDC

———————————————-

2. (C) In an April 23 meeting, Lee told Poloff that the Korean People’s Army’s (KPA) spate of high-level announcements over the past several months (such as the March 8 KPA Supreme Command report, the first in 15 years, and the four KPA General Staff statements since January, not seen since 1999) should not be misinterpreted as the DPRK military asserting control over the country, because the military could act only in concert with the Worker’s Party and the Cabinet. Instead the “generals appearing on TV” was a phenomenon directed at DPRK citizens with two goals: to show that the DPRK’s hostile external situation meant citizens had to pull together, and as a “power display” to send a law-and-order message to counter the increasing economic disorder resulting from decades of economic “depression.” There was dissatisfaction among some elite groups in the DPRK, who knew of economic reform in China and Vietnam and wondered why the DPRK had instead deteriorated. To tamp down this internal dissent, external tension was needed. The ROKG was not particularly worried about the specific threats to the South contained in the statements because they saw the statements as targeted at the domestic audience, and in any case knew the DPRK would try to achieve surprise if it were to resort to military action, rather than giving warning.

3. (C) The key factor in the background was 67-year-old Kim Jong-il’s (KJI) waning health. After KJI’s August 2008 stroke, the DPRK was a “different environment that needed stronger leadership.” Lee said that before the stroke, KJI was confident that he could rule for years, but afterward he suffered “physical and psychological trauma.” KJI had become obsessed with creating political stability to allow an orderly succession, though Lee did not claim to know who was next in line. Immediately after the April 5 missile launch the Supreme People’s Assembly had declared the beginning of KJI’s third ruling period. But rather than celebrating the renewal of his mandate, KJI was concentrating on changes that would pave the way for succession.

4. (C) The most important of these was the enlargement (from 8 to 13 members) and strengthening of the KJI-chaired National Defense Commission (NDC). The NDC was first established in 1998 with a largely symbolic role, but had since taken on policy and coordination functions. Now it had the lead on succession, Lee believed. KJI brother-in-law Chang Song-taek’s addition to the NDC was important for succession preparation, not only because he was married to KJI’s only sibling and close confidante 63-year-old Kim Kyong-hui, but also because Chang was seen as having effectively protected and acted for KJI during KJI’s fall 2008 recovery period.

5. (C) Another key change was the replacement of National Defense Commission Deputy Chairman Kim Yong-chun with Oh Kuk-ryul, a 78-year old Kim-family loyalist (in relative terms, since all senior officials are loyalists) who Lee thought was consolidating various ROK-surveillance and special operations institutions under his control at NDC. One of these was the Worker’s Party’s Operations Department, which Oh has headed since 1989. (Lee also referred to an April 21 JoongAng Ilbo newspaper article claiming that “Office 35,” charged with intel collection, and the “External Liaison Office,” charged with training agents, had both been moved from the Operations Department to NDC/KPA control, saying that ROK intel sources did not think there was

evidence of such a move.) The Operations Department, which formulates actions against the South, was “passive” during the 1999-2007 Sunshine Policy period, but was now becoming more active again. In other words, Oh’s job was to keep the South off balance and make sure that it did not disrupt the succession period. Lee said he believed that changes to the DPRK constitution, announced but not yet explained, would also focus on succession-related issues. He alluded to frequent DPRK propaganda aiming for the establishment of a “strong and prosperous” nation by 2012, saying that DPRK authorities believed they had already succeeded ideologically and militarily, so they were concentrating on the economic side, which is where the Kaesong Industrial Complex fit in.

6. (C) The DPRK’s determination to maintain internal order meant that it could go so far as to engage in “limited armed conflict” with the ROK. At the same time, the DPRK was well aware that ROK forces were ready for any provocation and would respond with superior force. In addition, the DPRK knew that combined ROK-U.S. surveillance capabilities would prevent it from achieving surprise, so Lee was reassured that no direct military provocation was imminent.

———————————-

Relations with the U.S.

———————————-

7. (C) Asked what the ROKG’s policy options were, given the above situation, Lee answered indirectly, saying that the main question was U.S.-DPRK relations. Second only to maintaining internal stability to allow for succession was the DPRK’s determination to improve relations with the U.S., because only the U.S. could solve both the DPRK’s security and economic problems. Lee said this push for improved relations was ironic, given DPRK rhetoric attacking the U.S. as a menace, but was nevertheless high on DPRK authorities’ agenda. Lee said the DPRK saw the 1999-2000 rapprochement with the Clinton Administration as the first, failed, chance for peace with the U.S.; that the Bush (43) Administration had turned to negotiations too late for substantial progress; and that the Obama Administration amounted to a “second chance.” The DPRK craved a dialogue with the U.S., aiming for a “big deal,” but first needed to raise tensions to create the need for dialogue.

8. (C) The scope for inter-Korean relations depended on what happened with U.S.-DPRK relations. Lee was convinced that the DPRK would keep tension high towards the South, while seeking an opening with the U.S. Therefore, his recommendation to ROK policymakers was to stay on an even keel to keep the South-North situation from deteriorating further. The DPRK’s April 21 proposal for dialogue about land-use and wages at the Kaesong Industrial Complex was potentially helpful in that regard, but had to be approached carefully, because the DPRK would try to seize the initiative and lock-in economic benefits without offering reciprocal steps. Like other ROKG officials, Lee emphasized the need for continued close U.S.-ROK coordination on all issues related to North Korea.

9. (C) Lee cautioned that China would seek to prevent U.S.-DPRK relations from improving too much, adding with a smile that had it not been for its attitude toward the U.S., China would have moved to prevent the October 2006 DPRK nuclear weapon test.

—————-

Mt. Kumgang

—————-

10. (C) As an aside, Lee commented on the July 2008 shooting death of a South Korean tourist at Mt. Kumgang. He said that KPA soldiers and sentries in the area, after frequent contact with South Korean tourists, had a tendency to be too relaxed, so KPA officers periodically conducted exercises to tighten discipline. The shooting had occurred during one of those exercise periods. STEPHENS

• DPRK
• North Korea
• security
• United States
• KPA
• Kaesong Industrial Complex
• Clinton
• Mt. Kumgang

Wednesday, August 23rd, 2006 6:50

Source Embassy Seoul

Classification CONFIDENTIAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SEOUL 0027731

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2020
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, KS, KN
SUBJECT:

Classified By: E. BEMHARI
Reasons 1.4 (b),(d).

SUMMARY

KIM’S NEWLETTER’S OMISSIONS

In addition to the national print media, Kim Jong-Il has launched his more personal newsletter on the nation’s intranet. Unsurprisingly, what the newsletter omits illuminates the precariousness of his power. For example, Kim writes that he has recently awarded his highest honors to those who are propelling the nation’s prosperity; Beijing reports that these once sacred gold coins with Kim’s likeness have surfaced in Chinese black markets. Additionally, XXXXXXX XX reports that South Korean dramas and foreign-made pornography are seeping through the borders.

END SUMMARY

BEMHARI

1. Kim’s online newsletter, “DISPATCHES FROM THE HEART OF THE NATION” is published on a bimonthly basis. The impetus for this is unknown. It seems that Kim is capitalizing on the new media. Now people can read less formal exhortations at their leisure in addition to radio blasts and the state newspaper. The intranet page is read widely at universities, where computers are more common. The newsletter is written in the first person, and Kim contemplates the (revised) history of the DPRK, current celebrations and mass games. It is obvious that Kim hopes to douse any seeds of discontent with his charming rhetoric. In the most recent edition, he reports awarding his highest honor to three party members who are doing their best in propelling the nation toward 2012. These awards consist of solid gold coins which feature his portrait. Kim does not award them frequently. In the past, these coins were valued beyond life. No one would ever consider selling one. XXXXXXXXX XX reports from Beijing that these coins were surfacing in Beijing and Shanghai markets. XXXXXXXXX XX  believes that this hints that the elite must be more cash and food starved than ever. One coin can fetch up to $500 USD in China. Kim’s article hints that he is aware of the resale of his rewards.

2. Chinese are profiting from North Korean’s lust for South Korean goods. Japanese, Chinese, and South Korean pornography is now so common that it’s given away freely with purchases of dramas. Alarmingly, it seems that Kim is profiting financially, by releasing his own pornographic collection to dealers in China. His agents are charging licensing fees and physically punishing vendors who do not comply. In return for fees, agents look the other way at vendor’s South Korean drama stock.

The presence of such regulation from the DPRK is straining ties with China. They neglect border areas in order to profit from trade and cheap labor, but they did not anticipate such violent codes of conduct from North Koreans, let alone agents sent by Kim. If China confronted the DPRK about the border situation, a cycle of anger and denial will begin, and so the Chinese remain torpid.

• North Korea
• kim jong-il
• Seoul embassy
• Beijing
• South Korean Dramas
• Pornography
• DPRK
• China